

CRESC

Centre de Recherche  
Economie Société Culture  
MOHAMMED VI POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY  
جامعة محمد السادس متعددة التخصصات

## RECHERCHES DU CRESC

n° 1, mars 2017

### A museum for governing marginality Conflicts over the heritage industry in the Rif

par Badiha Nahhass

This document can be downloaded at : [www.egerabat.com/cresc/?page\\_id=1424](http://www.egerabat.com/cresc/?page_id=1424)

To quote the document : Badiha Nahhass, « A museum for governing marginality. Conflicts over the heritage industry in the Rif », *Recherches du CRESC*, n°1, mars 2017

## **A museum for governing marginality Conflicts over the heritage industry in the Rif**

**Badiha Nahhass**

The Rif, like the whole country, mobilized in 2011. On Sunday 20 February, the streets of the main cities and suburban areas were filled with thousands of demonstrators. In the city of Al-Hoceima, late in the evening, public buildings (the town hall, the Al Bashaouia Palace, and so on), the headquarters of political parties and local banks were ransacked and torched. In the following days, clashes between demonstrators and police took place in different areas of the region. For more than a year, life in towns such as Beni Bouayach, Imzouren and Sidi Bouafif was dominated by the rhythm of weekly demonstrations and sit-ins. In contrast to what was happening elsewhere in the country, protests were largely supervised by unemployed graduates,<sup>1</sup> and demands focused on access to education, health and employment, but also on dignity and stringent criticisms of the high cost of living. Thus, it was marginality, in its various forms (political and economic marginality, and the marginality of identity) that the demonstrators were calling out and protesting against.

In the region, the 2011 protests presented the Rif as a marginal territory par excellence and expressed a request for recognition, such as that which had been voiced after the earthquake which, on the night of 24 February 2004, claimed about 700 lives, with thousands of injured, hundreds of homeless and severe material damage in Al-Hoceima and surroundings. Demonstrations that were then sparked in neighbouring villages, before reaching Al-Hoceima on 26 February, did not denounce just the slowness of the rescue services and the aid provided, but also the region's isolation and lack of infrastructure and basic health services, symbols of the marginalization of the Rif by the central government. These protests continued during the reconstruction period. In the village of Tamassint, they lasted three years, and were paradigmatic of this trend. A disaster movement supervised by unemployed graduates within the framework of the Tamassint Association for monitoring the consequences of the earthquake was created to protest, through sit-ins and marches, against the inanity of the government reconstruction programme, which consisted of a grant of some 30,000 dirhams and the provision of certain building materials to families whose homes had been destroyed or severely damaged.

These expressions of dissatisfaction with the 'absence of the state' reflect the way the Rif's marginality was transformed into a political question which led to the establishment of new government schemes. Over the last few years, the government has developed so-called 'structuring' projects (such as the port of Tangier Med and the emergency reconstruction programme after the 2004 earthquake) and tourist development projects (such as Souani Med and the Integrated Tourism Zone (NZT) project of Cala Iris as part of the tourist development scheme Vision Al Hoceima 2015). It has also promoted programmes of income generating activities (IGAs), such as those launched by the Agency for the Promotion and Economic and

---

<sup>1</sup> M. Nahhass, *Les Diplômés chômeurs d'Al-Hoceima à l'heure du Mouvement du 20 février*, master's dissertation in Political Sociology and Social Dynamics, Faculty of Law, Economics and Social Sciences, University Hassan II-Casablanca, 2013.

Social Development of the Prefectures and Provinces of the North of the Kingdom (Agence pour la Promotion et le Développement économique et social des préfectures et provinces du Nord du Royaume, or APDN), and it has proposed a community reparation programme within the framework of the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Instance Équité et Réconciliation, or IER), including the creation of the regional museum of Al-Hoceima. The study of these different schemes highlights a development in the treatment of marginality, a development arising both from the political changes undertaken at the end of the reign of Hassan II and pursued by Mohamed VI, and their repercussions on relations with the social actors of the Rif. This study also shows a divergence of understanding between a central state promoting development initiatives, and social movements aimed at managing marginality. While unemployed graduates are clamouring to be hired in the civil service (the strongest expression of the presence of the central state), public interventions in the region tend to promote the local dimension and a 'development' path specific to the Rif, through, inter alia, IGAs and the heritage industry. Instead of the 'development of the Rif by the centre' promoted by social movements we have the 'development of the Rif by the Rif' proposed by the central government. Nevertheless, these two trends adopt the same approach to marginality: they conceal its historicity and the plurality of phenomena from which it derives and which it covers; at the same time, they help to reify it. In different public schemes, marginality is reduced to the economic dimension alone, to backwardness in development and to the region's isolation, while the social actors insist on the political intentionality of this delay.

At first sight, the Rif regional museum project seems to transcend these limits. Designed as a response to the region's marginality, it is not based solely on the economic aspect of development and is favoured both by the government and official institutions and by social movements. If this project has been promoted by local associations since the 1990s, it has also, contingently, opportunistically and fleetingly, attracted the interest of others, starting with the government. How are we to explain this convergence on an 'object' which, in the light of the demonstrations, appears very remote and, as it were, detached from social demands and subjects of discontent? How can a museum, whose initial function is to exhibit, preserve and enhance 'collections of works of art, objects of cultural, artistic, historical, scientific and technical interest', govern the marginality of a territory? This working paper seeks to understand by what processes this museum has become a form of reparation and inclusion, and the meaning given to it. In what follows, I aim to underline what this policy of fostering the heritage industry tells us about the government of the social and the government of society, and what conflicts it reveals between local society and central government, over and above the complexity of what is perceived as marginality.

### **Marginality as a natural, inevitable and intentional fact: the negation of historicity**

The Rif museum project is part of the programme of community reparation developed by the IER on the basis of a participatory approach. Although, by definition, the project emphasizes the importance of history, it constitutes a textbook case of the denial of the historicity of marginality. In fact, the way in which it was conceived leads to turning

marginalization into the result of a deliberate strategy. On the one hand, the museum is presented as an unambiguous place of univocal memory, with the emphasis on the rehabilitation and preservation of ‘places of memory’ (Nora); it is not placed within a complex historical trajectory. On the other hand, the problem is set out in terms of ‘reparation’, as a way of attributing responsibility for the marginalization of the Rif to the state and its policy. The museum illustrates three ways in which the marginality of the Rif is narrated. The first treats it as a natural fact springing from the region’s geographical position and/or from the cultural and personal characteristics of its inhabitants. The second turns it into an inevitable outcome of the Rif’s historical trajectory. And the third considers it to be the result of an intentional strategy dictated by the deliberate will of the political authorities to neglect this territory.

### *Marginality as a natural fact*

The type of language that highlights the undeniable character of the Rif’s marginality is most often based on ‘natural’ arguments: the Rif is marginal because it is an ‘isolated’ ‘rugged area’, a ‘wild, mountainous land, difficult to travel in’. These arguments are used in the official language of the press, but also in colonial and postcolonial ‘scholarly’ discourse: ‘The enigma of the Rif is due to its geography, which imposed a certain marginality on these mountainous spaces. This has been accentuated by a historical specificity marked by turbulent phases and other times when there was a profound silence’,<sup>2</sup> and ‘in comparison with the Algerian or Tunisian Rif, the Moroccan Rif is markedly different in terms of area, marginalization and isolation, despite its two seaboard’.<sup>3</sup>

Before analyzing the ‘natural’ marginality of the Rif, let us first specify what exactly is meant by the term ‘the Rif’. This toponym was used by the geographer Ibn Said in the thirteenth century, then by the historian Abdelhaq al Badisi in the fourteenth, to designate either the whole of the Mediterranean coast of Morocco, or the part corresponding to the central zone of the coastline.<sup>4</sup> Geographically speaking, the Rif is the massive arc extending over more than 300 kilometres from Tangier in the west to Melilla in the east; a moderately high mountain range – except in its central part, where Jebel Tidghine, the highest peak in the chain, reaches 2,456 metres, – very rugged and divided, crossed by deep valleys and high, steep coastal cliffs punctuated by bays that are sometimes difficult to access from land. The chain is presented as a frontier, an impassable barrier that makes communication between the Rif and the rest of the country difficult – and this explains both the isolation of this territory and its marginality, as well as the high number of emigrants from it.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> A. Siraj, ‘De Ighzar amakrane à Akros : réflexion rétrospective sur les sources historiques du Rif’, in D. El Yazami and A. Siraj (eds.), *Rif: les traces de l’histoire*, proceedings of the conference ‘Patrimoine culturel du Rif: quelle muséographie?’ (Casablanca: La Croisée des chemins, 2012), p. 68.

<sup>3</sup> G. Maurer, ‘Facteurs physiques et aménagement dans la montagne rifaine’, *Revue de la faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines de Tétouan*, 4, 1990, pp. 93-101.

<sup>4</sup> É. Michaux-Bellaire, ‘L’histoire du Rif’, in *Rif et Jbala – Bulletin de l’enseignement public du Maroc*, 71 (Paris: Émile Larose, 1926); M. Aziza, *La Sociedad rifeña frente al protectorado, español en Marruecos (1912-1956)* (Barcelona: Ediciones Bellaterra, 2003).

<sup>5</sup> C.-A. Julien, *Le Maroc face aux impérialismes, 1415-1956* (Paris: Éditions J. A., 1978), p. 121.

The construction of the ‘geographic’ marginality of the Rif does not exclude its openness to the rest of the country and the Mediterranean, nor its important role at several times in the history of Morocco. Despite the common perception of an inhospitable Rif, it has been a place of transit and encounter for large-scale movements of human populations in the Mediterranean ever since antiquity, as evidenced by many prehistoric sites, and also a region of contact between the worlds of the Mediterranean and the East.<sup>6</sup> According to the authors cited above, the golden age of the Rif was in the Middle Ages. From the eighth century onwards, the Rif was the site of the first Islamic emirate in Morocco, even before the founding of Fez. The emirate of Nekour (or Nakour) played the role of a ‘buffer’ state between the Umayyad caliphate in the east, and the Fatimids of Tunisia. The Rif was thus the theatre of several conflicts between the political forces of the East and the far West of the Muslim world (the conquest of al-Andalus, relations with the Kingdom of Grenada, conflict with the Fatimids of Tunisia, the Reconquista, the Portuguese occupation, and so on)<sup>7</sup> and the terminus of the most important trade routes from the Sahara. This led to the establishment of several ports, such as Bades, the port of Fez under the Marinids, as well as Melilla and Al Mazamma, through which passed the caravan trade of goods and merchandise from Africa to Europe (the ports of Venice, Pisa, Genoa, Marseille, Andalusia, and Catalonia, among others) and from the Muslim world to the east. Bades and Adouz were also centres of Sufism and *jihad* (privateering) activities defending the country against foreign invasions. Control of the Mediterranean by the Ottoman Empire, geographical discoveries and the reorientation of trade routes to the Atlantic contributed to the gradual disappearance of the ports around which small and medium-sized towns on the Rif coast had developed.<sup>8</sup> Some Moroccan authors place this first major change in the sixteenth century, with the occupation of strategic points on the coast (the ‘presides’) by the Spaniards.<sup>9</sup> The Rif then entered a period of withdrawal and isolation. Cut off from its coast, it also lost contact with the South. This isolation put an end to its political role and to its relative prosperity. This increased under the Spanish protectorate, as the city of Tangier gradually became more international.

The region’s inaccessibility and geographical inhospitality is often linked to the character of the Rif’s inhabitants. If the Rif is marginalized, it is because the Riffians are ‘rude mountain folk, with difficult temperament’, ‘rebellious’, ‘individualist’, ‘daring’, ‘independence-minded people with a sense of autonomy, pride and honour’, and ‘half-savage warriors’. Stigmatization of the Riffians is found frequently in early anthropological and ethnographic writing on the region, and has often been transformed into a form of self-stigmatization. Thirsty for ‘unlimited freedom’, imbued with a ‘culture of resistance’, Riffians, it has been claimed, are in a state of permanent war to defend their independence and ‘fierce individualism’.<sup>10</sup> The American anthropologist David Hart, meanwhile, has insisted on the violence of social conflicts within Riffian society and the high number of vendettas during

---

<sup>6</sup> El Yazami and Siraj (eds.), *Rif: les traces de l’histoire*, p. 18.

<sup>7</sup> A. Sabah, ‘Monuments et sites historiques médiévaux du Rif’, in El Yazami and Siraj (eds.), *Rif: les traces de l’histoire*, pp. 37-54.

<sup>8</sup> Sabah, ‘Monuments et sites historiques médiévaux du Rif’.

<sup>9</sup> F. Zaim, ‘Le Maroc et l’espace méditerranéen au Moyen Âge’, *Revue du présent*, 2, 1988, pp. 77-89.

<sup>10</sup> S. Biarnay, ‘Notes sur les chants populaires du Rif’, *Archives berbères*, 1 (1), 1915, p. 26.

the pre-colonial period. Related mainly to inheritance and the division of land, these conflicts can be explained by individualism and the sense of independence,<sup>11</sup> or indeed the social anarchy of the Riffians, which mirrors the broken terrain in which they live.<sup>12</sup>

In the collective Spanish imagination, the myth of the savagery of the Riffians was a social construct that became embodied in the figure of the ‘Moro’, during the Rif War and in particular the Civil War. The Spanish press of the time, and colonial literature, abound with stigmatizations of *el moro*.<sup>13</sup> After Independence, this representation would persist in the shape of the ‘rude mountain folk’ and the ‘rebels’. Other forms of stigmatization, as smugglers, bandits and drug barons, for example, emerged after a speech by Hassan II, in the aftermath of the 1984 riots, seeing the people of the North (Al-Hoceima, Nador and Tétouan) as no more than ‘*awbach* [savages], unemployed people who live by theft and smuggling’. The Rif thus acquired a negative brand image. This stigmatization can be hard to eradicate: during the 2011 demonstrations, police officers are said to have called the demonstrators ‘sons of Spaniards’ (*ouled spanyoul*). Many of these stigmatizations have been internalized by local populations, some as positive values, such as the ‘rebel’, the ‘warrior’, ‘people with a sense of honour and pride’, others less so, such as those associating them with drugs and political violence.<sup>14</sup>

As with the geographical marginality of the Rif, there is nothing natural about the features associated with the temperament and character of the Riffians. These features are actually part of an economic history often perceived as one of dissent. Traditional agriculture, based on home-grown consumption, soon proved to be unable to meet the needs of a growing population,<sup>15</sup> which led to increased emigration, but also to the development of illegal activities such as the practice of smuggling, together with a rapid and irreversible commercialization of kif from the 1970s onwards. The historical sources date the beginning of cannabis cultivation in the Rif to the fifteenth century, although some authors trace it back to the Arab invasions of the seventh century.<sup>16</sup> Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Sultan Hassan I authorized five villages in Ketama and Beni Khaled to grow cannabis so as to contribute to the ‘pacification’ of the region.<sup>17</sup> During the Rif War, Mohamed ben Abdelkrim el-Khattabi prohibited its cultivation and consumption, which in his view were contrary to the precepts of Islam. At the end of the War, the authorities of the Spanish Protectorate authorized these tribes to resume its production. The prohibition on cultivating or consuming cannabis, confirmed by the *dahir* of 24 April 1954 under the French Protectorate, including in Al Haouz and Gharb, was extended to the Rif after independence – but it is known that this was never effective.

---

<sup>11</sup> D. Montgomery Hart, *The Aith Waryaghar of the Moroccan Rif: an Ethnography and History* (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Press, 1976).

<sup>12</sup> R. Montagne, ‘Abd el Krim’, *Politique étrangère*, 3, 1947, pp. 301-24 (p. 302).

<sup>13</sup> V. Moga Romero, ‘Los tejedores de ensueños’, *Mélanges de la Casa de Velázquez*, 37 (1), 2007, <http://mcv.revues.org/1911>.

<sup>14</sup> K. Afsahi and K. Mouna, ‘Cannabis dans le Rif central (Maroc). Construction d’un espace de déviance’, *Espacestems.net*, 2014, [www.espacestems.net/articles/cannabis-dans-le-rif-central-maroc/](http://www.espacestems.net/articles/cannabis-dans-le-rif-central-maroc/).

<sup>15</sup> H. Ramou, ‘Le Rif: cadre naturel et humain et processus du développement’, A. El Khatir (ed.), *Contributions à l’étude de la région du Rif* (Rabat: Ircam, 2011), p. 55.

<sup>16</sup> P.-A. Chouvy, ‘Production de cannabis et de haschich au Maroc: contexte et enjeux’, *L’Espace politique*, 2007, <http://espacepolitique.revues.org/index59.html>.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

Intended for local consumption,<sup>18</sup> the cultivation of cannabis underwent significant transformations only in the 1970s, when it became a commercial product of great economic value on the international market and war had made it impossible to grow it in Afghanistan and Lebanon, so that the European market was now open to Rifian cannabis. Growing European demand stimulated the spread of this crop, which now occupies a large part of the region's arable land: according to the first survey of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 'a quarter of the agricultural sector in the Rif region is now occupied by expanding cannabis crops'.<sup>19</sup> Morocco has become the world's largest cannabis producer, providing nearly 80% of the European market.<sup>20</sup> Its production is the main source of revenue for the Rif, and one of the main sources of foreign currency for the country.<sup>21</sup> People talk of an 'annual market of 10 billion euros [...] in the hands of the trafficking networks operating principally in Europe'.<sup>22</sup> From this significant financial windfall, however, the estimated 800,000 cannabis growers derive little benefit: indeed, '72% of them market the product as a raw material and only 24% of producers try to turn it into hashish'.<sup>23</sup>

The economic history of the region also shows that smuggling cannot be explained as arising from the temperament of the Riffians. Smuggling dates back to the pre-colonial period, when it happened with the 'presides' and the isolated areas under Spanish occupation. In the second half of the nineteenth century, smuggling benefited from the intensification of competition between European countries for the conquest of the Moroccan market. In order to avoid customs duty, or to circumvent the ban on the import and export of certain products, traders then engaged in smuggling activities on the coast of the Rif.<sup>24</sup> After Independence, these activities resumed in the enclave of Melilla and on the border with Algeria. Food products, clothing, household appliances and car accessories from the enclave flooded the markets of the Rif and were transported to the interior of the country. With Algeria, cannabis was exchanged for food products, medicines and gas oil, suggesting a close interlocking of smuggling networks and cannabis networks, and sometimes illegal immigration.

### *Marginality as an inevitable fact*

The way we think about the marginality of the Rif does not rely solely on supposedly natural characteristics, but also derives from its problematization as an inevitable result of its historical trajectory. Nevertheless, the specificities of the colonial history of the former northern zone, different from the history of the southern zone, point less to an inevitable

---

<sup>18</sup> Ramou, 'Le Rif', p. 61.

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and Agence pour la promotion et le développement économique et social des préfectures et provinces du nord du royaume, *Enquête sur le cannabis*, 2003, [www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/morocco\\_cannabis\\_survey\\_2003\\_fr.pdf](http://www.unodc.org/pdf/publications/morocco_cannabis_survey_2003_fr.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> M. Peraldi, 'Economies criminelles et mondes d'affaire à Tanger', *Cultures & Conflits*, 68, winter 2007, <http://conflits.revues.org/5973>.

<sup>21</sup> P.-A. Chouvy, 'Morocco's smuggling rackets: hashish, people and contraband', *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 17 (12), December 2005, pp. 40-43; B. Hibou, 'Les enjeux de l'ouverture au Maroc. Dissidence économique et contrôle politique', *Les Études du Ceri*, 15, April 1996; A. Labrousse and L. Romero, *Rapport sur la situation du cannabis dans le Rif marocain* (Paris: Observatoire français des drogues et toxicomanies (OFDT), 2001).

<sup>22</sup> *Enquête sur le cannabis*.

<sup>23</sup> Ramou, 'Le Rif', p. 62.

<sup>24</sup> G. Ayache, *Les Origines de la guerre du Rif* (Rabat: Société marocaine des éditeurs réunis, 1981), pp. 107-108.

trajectory than to a tangle of unfavourable circumstances. During the first ten years of its protectorate, Spain, incapable of imposing its authority over the whole of the territory, controlled and limited its colonial policy to exploiting natural resources. Based on primitive accumulation, this activity provoked violent reactions. Three main reasons have been put forward by historians to explain the moderation of Spanish colonization: the internal political crisis on the Spanish mainland, the economic crisis, and the backwardness of Spanish capitalism.

Thanks to agreements between the European powers and the Act of Algeciras of 1906, Spain obtained the endorsement of the international community to establish a protectorate over Northern Morocco, established in 1912 under the convention signed with France on 27 November 1912 in Madrid, and accepted by the Sultan the following year in the *dahir* of 13 May 1913. Spain thus found itself in possession of a small piece of land – barely 20,000 square kilometres, two thirds of which were mountains – of which it knew almost nothing although it had established a presence at strategic points on the coast in the sixteenth century,<sup>25</sup> and where it came up against a fierce resistance that rendered any mission of ‘pacification’ difficult and costly, both economically and politically. Spain’s interest in this region dates from the second half of the nineteenth century and the foreseeable loss of Cuba, which laid bare the political, economic, social and economic crisis in Spain and its loss of prestige, subsequent to its defeat in 1898 and the loss of its final colonies in the Caribbean and the Philippines. Such a situation gave legitimacy to the aspirations of certain sectors of Spanish capital that were tempted, albeit modestly, by a new colonial adventure.<sup>26</sup> ‘Spanish Africanism’ nourished the myth of the great mineral wealth of the Rif and attracted considerable Spanish and international capital (French, German and British).<sup>27</sup>

Spain imposed its dominion over the whole territory only in 1927, the date of the end of the war of resistance in the Rif. Disputes and conflicts between Spain and Riffian tribes predated the Protectorate, such as the 1893 incident between the garrison of Melilla and the Guelaaya who were hostile to the building of a fort next to the mausoleum of Sidi Ouariach, and the resistance movement of Chérif Amezian in the eastern Rif between 1909 and 1912. However, as early as 1920, resistance in the central Rif assumed another dimension. It was organized by Mohamed ben Abdelkrim, and in June 1921, the first episodes of the Rif War began. Faced with poorly equipped combatants, the ‘modern’ Spanish army resorted to air war and poison gas, causing great destruction and many casualties among civilians. In April 1925, the Riffian resistance launched an offensive against French military posts on the edge of Wadi Ouergha, triggering an alliance between France and Spain which obliged ben Abdelkrim to surrender to the French on 27 May 1926 and signified the end of the war, announced on 10 July 1927 by General Sanjurjo at Bab Taza.

Until the end of the Rif war, and even afterwards, the actions of the Protectorate authorities were subject to the logic of the military control of the territory, which consisted of

---

<sup>25</sup> E. M. Corrales, ‘El protectorado español en Marruecos (1912-1956). Una perspectiva histórica’, [www.oocities.org/annual\\_1921/07\\_03\\_perspectiva.htm](http://www.oocities.org/annual_1921/07_03_perspectiva.htm).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Aziza, *La sociedad rifeña*, p. 35.



building roads to facilitate communication between units of the Spanish army.<sup>28</sup> They were also dependent on the meanders of political life in mainland Spain. During the Republic (1931-1936), Spanish governments, though very critical of the colonialist endeavours of previous administrations, were absorbed by the problems of the mainland and abandoned the protectorate, limiting their activities in the zone: their primary concern was to restrict their expenditure.<sup>29</sup> During the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), the only concern of the Protectorate authorities was to maintain order and recruit Riffians to fight in mainland Spain. The economic and political crisis of the 1930s and the Spanish Civil War weighed heavily on the economic development of the Protectorate zone, all the more so as Spanish capitalism, still very dependent on foreign capital, was reluctant to invest in a poor and hostile territory.<sup>30</sup> The main investors, a handful of businesses run by important families close to political and financial circles,<sup>31</sup> chose to place their money in sectors where profitability was more immediate and export-oriented, such as mining, trade, agriculture and construction. Ore, exported without any significant refinement to European countries, was the main source of revenue for the Spanish zone of the Protectorate.<sup>32</sup> Protest and resistance from the tribes led by Chérif Amezian soon put paid to this ‘agricultural expansion’. Beginning in 1916, this process accelerated with the creation of the *Compañía española de Colonización del Rif oriental* and the transformation of many military posts into centres of agricultural activity (Nador, Selouan, Mont-Arruit, Zaio, Tafersit).<sup>33</sup> The working of the land was entrusted to private companies which distributed them to small or medium-sized settlers. These acquisitions were also carried out by expropriations, forced and fraudulent sales, which led to anger and resistance among the Riffian tribes, while triggering the disintegration of traditional tribal structures. Farmers deprived of their land were obliged to join the labour market as workers in mines and agriculture or as seasonal workers in Algeria,<sup>34</sup> especially since they faced competition from Spanish workers.<sup>35</sup>

The modest economic action of the Spanish protectorate mortgaged the Rif’s future, which, at the time of Independence was one of the poorest regions in terms of infrastructure and social services: control offices (*Oficinas de la Intervención*) and military barracks were more numerous than hospitals and schools,<sup>36</sup> the road network covered no more than 2,000 kilometres, the rail network 230 kilometres, while communication between the eastern and western zones of the Rif was almost impossible.

---

<sup>28</sup> J.-L. Villanova, ‘Las políticas de desarrollo rural en la zona de protectorado de España en Marruecos (1912-1956)’, in *Mutations des milieux ruraux dans les montagnes rifaines* (Tétouan: Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi, 2005), p. 127.

<sup>29</sup> J.-L. Villanova, ‘Repercusiones medioambientales de la acción colonial española en el Norte de Marruecos (1912-1956)’, in *Équipe de recherches géographiques sur le Rif* (ed.), *Questions environnementales dans les montagnes rifaines* (Tétouan: Publications de la Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines de l’Université Abdelmalek Essaâdi, 2008), pp. 9-44.

<sup>30</sup> Villanova, ‘Las políticas de desarrollo rural’.

<sup>31</sup> Aziza, *La Sociedad rifeña*, p. 76.

<sup>32</sup> V. T. Pérez, *La Economía marroquí : aportación al estudio de la economía marroquí referida especialmente a las zonas españolas* (Barcelona: Bosch, 1943), p. 149.

<sup>33</sup> Aziza, *La Sociedad rifeña*, p. 76.

<sup>34</sup> M. Lazaar, ‘Conséquences de l’émigration dans les montagnes du Rif central’, *Revue européenne de migrations internationales*, 3 (1-2), pp. 97-114.

<sup>35</sup> Corrales, ‘El protectorado español’.

<sup>36</sup> Aziza, *La Sociedad rifeña*.

### *Marginality as an intentional fact*

The specificities of national history, which were reflected in this region by extending the system of the legal, economic, cultural and social norms of the central state, are often used to support the view that the marginality of the Rif was not only the result of natural characteristics and an inevitable destiny, but also of a government strategy. The fact that the museum project stemmed from the IER, and therefore from governmental action, provided new evidence for this interpretation. A detailed analysis of the policy pursued since independence, however, tends to relativize this reading. The role played by Hassan II, then crown prince, in the repression of the 1958-1959 revolt, and his ‘policy of punishment and systematic exclusion’ from development imposed on the Rif made a strong impression. This ‘policy of punishment’ aimed at the Rif was expressed in particular by his refusal to visit the region throughout his reign. The Riffians’ sense of being unloved was accentuated when, in a televised speech in the aftermath of the 1984 riots, Hassan II insulted the people of the north (Al-Hoceima, Nador and Tétouan) and supported his remarks with a phrase which remained famous, re-activating as it did the trauma of the 1958-1959 repression: ‘You knew Moulay Hassan, I do not advise you to get to know Hassan II!’

This sense of being cursed is concomitant with the idea that marginalization is intentionally produced by the government, an idea made possible by the regional *imaginaire* and a local collective memory built around the violence of the process of unification that followed independence, and the extent of the repression that accompanied it. In fact, the unification of the former southern zone and the former northern zone in the Rif resulted in a process of annexation for the benefit of the ‘centre’ and the extension of the latter’s system of legal, economic, cultural and social norms. This annexation did not fail to aggravate the economic and social crisis in the region. The same was true of monetary unification: the replacement of the Spanish peseta by the Moroccan franc caused a rise in prices in the northern zone; this rise, coupled with the introduction of new taxes and the unemployment resulting from the end of recruitment by the Spanish and French armies and the closure of the borders with Algeria – which meant the cessation of Riffian seasonal emigration – stifled the region’s economy.<sup>37</sup> As for linguistic unification, it placed the Riffian elites at a disadvantage: they had been marginalized by the monopoly of the French language in local administration as early as 1958, and in education as early as 1963.<sup>38</sup> If language played a leading role in this exclusion, it was above all the French model of administration which widened the gap between the Riffian elite and the central state. This elite was made up of caïds, some of whom were in the resistance movement alongside Mohamed ben Abdelkrim and then in the service of the Spaniards; it also included sons of caïds who had inherited their fathers’ positions in the Spanish administration, and notables and educated persons who had studied in Tétouan, Fez or Cairo. After the departure of the Spaniards, this elite was excluded from positions of

---

<sup>37</sup> R. Leveau, *Le Fella marocain défenseur du trône* (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1976); J. Waterbury, *The Commander of the Faithful. The Moroccan Elite. A Study of Segmented Politics* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970).

<sup>38</sup> Beginning in 1959, a new education policy was defined. It was based on unification, Arabization, generalization and Moroccanization. See F. Benzakour, D. Gaadi and A. Queffélec, *Le Français au Maroc. Lexique et contacts de langues* (Louvain-la-Neuve: De Boeck supérieur, 2000).

authority (from governor to the lower echelons), and replaced by people from the Istiqlal Party who came from the rest of the country. So the elite felt marginalized, reduced to silence, and even held in contempt by the new officials of the administration.<sup>39</sup>

The revolt of 1958-59 and its repression occupy a central position in this memory of unification. The Moroccan Liberation Army (Armée de Libération du Maroc or ALM) launched its first attacks on French military posts in the region in October 1955. After independence, the dissolution of the ALM and the integration in March 1956 of several of its members into the ranks of the Royal Armed Forces (Forces Armées Royales or FAR), with the settling of accounts this process involved, the assassination of Abbès Messaadi, the ALM leader in Nador, and the disappearance of other members of the ALM in the Rif, constituted the first crisis in the relations between the Rif and the new central government.<sup>40</sup> The second high point in this tense situation took place between October 1958 and February 1959, when the Rif was shaken by serious disturbances, referred to generically as the 'Rif events'. The malaise in the Riffian countryside after 1956 was transformed in 1958, when the transferral of the remains of Abbès Messaadi from Fez to Ajdir and the arrest of the leaders of the Popular Movement party triggered a collective mobilization against the central state. This movement, described as 'rural rebellion' or 'tribal rebellion', took the form of civil disobedience and confrontations with the police. It was violently repressed by the Royal Armed Forces. These events redefined the place of the 'centre' in the geography of the region. Tétouan, capital of the Protectorate, and Tangier, an international city that played an important role in the struggle for independence, were downgraded while Rabat became more important. Above all, the modes of government changed. Ever since the reign of Moulay Rachid (1666-1672) and Moulay Ismail (1673-1721), the region had been governed by a representative of the Sultan chosen from among the great families of the region, or else, from the reign of Moulay Hassan I (1873-1894) onwards, by caids and cadis (judges) from the tribes. But after unification, the presence of the state and its administrative representatives, unconnected to the region, became huge.

The 'years of lead' represent another high point in repression and local memory. Left-wing militants were not the only ones targeted; repression also concerned young activists of the Amazigh Cultural Movement, whose associations were dissolved or prohibited and its members gaoled. This repression reached its peak in 1984 when, in January, demonstrations shook the northern cities; they brought together students (protesting against the rise in commodity prices and the decision of the Ministry of National Education to increase tuition fees), and the local population (critical of restricted access to Melilla and the resources of smuggling). They degenerated into riots and were violently repressed, as on 19 January in Nador, with dozens of dead, missing and mass arrests in Tétouan, Al-Hoceima and Nador.<sup>41</sup>

---

<sup>39</sup> This feeling was expressed frequently by those I interviewed in the region between 2010 and 2012.

<sup>40</sup> M. Zade, *Résistance et Armée de libération au Maroc (1947-1956). De l'action politique à la lutte armée: rupture ou continuité?* (Rabat: Haut-Commissariat aux anciens résistants et anciens membres de l'armée de libération, 2006); M. Lkhawaja, *L'Armée de libération du Maroc (1951-1956)... et mémoires pour l'histoire ou camouflage* (Rabat: Dar Bouregreg, 2007); M. Maâti, *La Monarchie marocaine et la lutte pour le pouvoir: Hassan II face à l'opposition nationale de l'indépendance à l'État de l'exception* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992); Z. M'Barek, *Le Mouvement de libération marocain et l'indépendance inachevée, 1948-1958* (Rabat: Bouregreg, 2009).

<sup>41</sup> Comments gathered from various members of local associations during my field trips between 2009 and 2013. The final IER report speaks of 49 deaths in the various northern cities during these January riots. See *Royaume*

In the same way, migration gives rise to an intentionalist reading: the region is one of those that has most fuelled emigration, and this is interpreted as a ‘forced emigration’. While Riffian emigration is not a recent phenomenon, it assumed another dimension after 1959 in terms of extent, destination and nature. The huge numbers of Riffians who left for various European countries in the early 1960s have been seen as the expression of a deliberate policy on the part of the central government, aimed at ‘emptying the Rif of its people’ so as to prevent possible revolts and alleviate social tensions in the region. This interpretation is not only promoted by opponents and the local population: some academic work argues that the authorities encouraged Riffian emigration by facilitating the necessary procedures, namely the obtaining of a passport, and directing European recruiters towards that region.<sup>42</sup>

Careful examination of these data suggests, however, that this interpretation needs to be tempered, as it ignores the tradition of emigration among the Riffians. If the economic factor (droughts, epidemics, the relative lack of natural resources) was admittedly decisive in these emigrations, they can also be explained by social and political factors, witness the migration to Algeria of several families of the Baqqioua tribe after the punitive expedition of Bouchetta el Baghdadi, where they played an important role in the welcome given to Riffian seasonal workers,<sup>43</sup> which grew from the second half of the nineteenth century onwards. Historically, the Rif was in permanent contact with Oranie, as illustrated by the trade relations between the two regions. However, with the colonization of Algeria by France in 1830 and the beginning of French settlements there, seasonal workers from the Rif started to travel to the area on a regular basis, especially to clear land and bring in the harvest on the settlers’ farms.<sup>44</sup> Some of these seasonal workers helped build up the rail network in sub-Saharan Africa in 1895.<sup>45</sup> Riffians migrated in ever increasing numbers at the turn of the century, when a sea link was established between the ports of Melilla and Oran, albeit with significant variations from one year to the next. After Morocco’s independence in 1956, the closure of borders with Algeria temporarily put an end to these seasonal and circular migrations, which resumed in 1959, but in a different way and with different destinations: the former Riffian seasonal workers in Algeria now moved to France, where they encountered their former employers, notably in Corsica and in the Midi.<sup>46</sup> Germany was another major destination for Riffians as a result of the purchase of iron ore from the Compagnie espagnole des mines du Rif by German companies familiar with the region.<sup>47</sup> This last example underlines the way many different circumstances were interwoven in Riffian migration. The intentional interpretation of migration is further undermined by the fact that the flow of Riffian emigrants had begun before Morocco signed the bilateral labour exchanges with European countries (France and

---

*du Maroc, Instance Équité et Réconciliation*, final report, vol. 2, Publications du Conseil Consultatif des Droits de l’Homme, Rabat, 2009, pp. 80-84.

<sup>42</sup> Lazaar, ‘Conséquences de l’émigration’; M. Aziza, ‘L’émigration dans le Rif marocain (XIX-XXe siècles). Une approche historique’, in M. Bokbot, A. Cebrian, A. Faleh and J. Serrano (eds.), *Les Migrations marocaines. Visions croisées à travers le détroit* (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 2011), pp. 15-37.

<sup>43</sup> A. Attaybi, *Le Rif avant le protectorat. Les tribus de la côte du Rif central (1860-1912)* (Al-Hoceima: Éditions Tifraz, 2008), p. 105.

<sup>44</sup> M. Aziza, ‘Un siècle et demi de migrations rifaines. De l’émigration saisonnière à l’émigration permanente’, *Revue Migrations*, 24, 2005, [http://www.generiques.org/wp-content/uploads/old-mages/pdf/Migrance\\_24.pdf](http://www.generiques.org/wp-content/uploads/old-mages/pdf/Migrance_24.pdf).

<sup>45</sup> J.-L. Miège, *Le Maroc et l’Europe (1830-1894)*, vol 2: *L’Ouverture* (Paris: PUF, 1961), p. 391.

<sup>46</sup> Aziza, ‘Un siècle et demi’.

<sup>47</sup> Aziza, ‘L’émigration dans le Rif marocain’.

Germany in 1963, Belgium in 1964, the Netherlands in 1969); these conventions converted the Rif into the second main area of recruitment of workers for major European industrial centres, after the region of Souss.

### **The narrowing range of the different meanings of the struggle against marginality**

Since independence, public programmes and policies have neither recognized nor expressed marginality in its various different meanings, reducing it to its sole economic dimension, as an aspect of the region's backwardness or isolation. This reduction of the meaning of marginality, which results from it being interpreted as a natural fact, an inevitable fate or an intentional design, denies the historicities and specificities of each of its facets. Paradoxically, such a denial also inspires the logic of the IER, since by demanding 'reconciliation' and expressing the desire to 'move on from the years of lead', it assumes that the Rif deserves reparation for solely political reasons.

#### *A general tendency to reduce the sense of marginality to its economic facet alone*

The extension of Opération Labour to the Rif, shortly after the events of 1958-1959, can be considered as the first intervention aimed to combat the marginality of the region. This national programme, launched by the government in 1957, consisted of ploughing the land of small farmers to increase agricultural production, and was extended to include the Rif in response to one of the demands submitted to the king by the 'delegation of Riffian tribes' in November 1958. The rural economic development of the Western Rif (DERRO) was embarked on shortly thereafter, with the financial support of international organizations (FAO, IBRD, the UN Special Fund). Viewed as the first major programme for the region's development since independence, it was structured along two main lines: the first, centred on the fight against soil erosion, was reflected in a programme of large-scale reforestation aimed at the preservation and protection of the soil and the revitalizing of the Rif vineyards; the second, focusing on the renovation and modernization of the local rural economy, enabled the introduction of modern techniques for the modification of agricultural systems and methods and the creation of a basic infrastructure network (roads, schools, health centres) with the aim of improving farmers' living conditions and curbing migration. Spread over more than twenty-five years, DERRO has helped in the management of land and ravines, the maintenance of plantations, the introduction of new crops, reforestation, the construction of the roads for agricultural development, etc. Despite these considerable achievements, it did not become 'an integrated project that has enabled the overall rural development of the Rif',<sup>48</sup> due in particular to its technical, centralized approach, one that is 'authoritarian and generous in terms of compensation', so that 'the results achieved [have fallen] below the objectives set

---

<sup>48</sup> S. Boujrouf, 'La montagne dans la politique d'aménagement du territoire du Maroc', *Revue de géographie alpine*, 84 (4), 1996, pp. 37-50.

out'.<sup>49</sup> It was also criticized for its inability to modify land use, since 'undesirable crops still exist'.<sup>50</sup>

Following on from DERRO, but explicitly drawing on a participatory approach, the GEF-RIF project (Gestion participative des écosystèmes forestiers du Rif, or Participatory Management of Forest Ecosystems in the Rif) was launched in 1993. With a view to eradicating the cultivation of kif, it aimed to protect the environment by raising general awareness of new ways of producing and managing natural resources. The first phase of this project, led by the department of Eaux et Forêts (forestry and water), with financial and technical support from the European Union, focused on the identification of sites of ecological, biological and forestry interest to draw up the programme for a 'participatory' management of natural resources. As a result of this study, in 1994 a convention was signed with the EU to finance, over three years, a central Rif forests protection programme.<sup>51</sup> Some of the positive results of this experiment have been extended, and in 2001 led to two integrated rural development and participatory development projects in the forest and peri-forest zones of Chefchaouen under the MEDA programme (this is an acronym of *mesures d'ajustement*, i.e. adjustment measures).<sup>52</sup>

In 1995, the creation by Hassan II of the Agence pour la promotion et le développement économique et social des préfectures et provinces du nord du Royaume (APDN or Agency for the Promotion and Economic and Social Development of the Prefectures and Provinces of the North of the Kingdom) did not represent a break with the economic, sectoral, centralized and reductive treatment of the marginality of the Rif which until that date had characterized government programmes and actions. The agency, designed to 'make of the regions of the North, which had long been backward but had significant potential, a model for integrated regional development', was set up after the Process of Barcelona signed between the European Union and Morocco, but also from the growing pressure from Europe to ensure that Moroccan authorities would reduce and control cannabis production and illegal emigration. The APDN, which covers the northern provinces belonging to the two regions of Tangier-Tétouan and Taza-Al-Hoceima-Taounate, is a public institution, attached to the Primature and enjoying financial autonomy; it is responsible for the coordination of development policies for the regions of the North. It has built its strategy on the opening up of the region, which has led, in the Programme d'action intégrée pour le Développement et l'aménagement de la Région méditerranéenne (PAIDAR-Med or Integrated Action Programme or the Development and Planning of the Mediterranean Region), to the establishment of basic infrastructures and large-scale economic activities such as the port of Tangier Med, the Mediterranean ring road and the seaside resort of Saïdia, as well as IGAs. The APDN has also been a tool for combatting the cultivation of cannabis by introducing alternative crops; the main instrument of this has been the Programme de développement intégré (PDI, or Integrated Development Programme).

---

<sup>49</sup> H. Ramou, 'Le Rif: cadre naturel et humain et processus du développement', p. 74.

<sup>50</sup> Boujrrouf, 'La montagne'.

<sup>51</sup> Y. Melhaoui, 'Protection et gestion participative des écosystèmes forestiers du RIF, Maroc', [www.fao.org/3/a-y4807b/Y4807B31.pdf](http://www.fao.org/3/a-y4807b/Y4807B31.pdf).

<sup>52</sup> Malhaoui, 'Protection et gestion participative'.

All these programmes and measures tend to reduce the marginality of the Rif to its economic dimension alone. This tendency has not been called into question by the ‘new reign’, despite the discourse on the ‘new’ government policies pursued in the region by Mohamed VI since his accession in 1999. The king’s tour in the Rif, two months after his coronation, symbolized this renewal. This was the second visit of a king to the region since independence, after that of Mohamed V in 1959, and it was interpreted as the beginning of a change in relations between the monarchy and the region. Nevertheless, a brief analysis of this ‘new’ policy suggests that the philosophy of intervention has remained the same. Its first aspect, which can be described as economic, is based on the ‘policy of major projects’ and ‘major structuring projects’, such as the complex of the port of Tangier Med, the programme of reconstruction of Al-Hoceima after the 2004 earthquake, the Nador West Med port project, the development of the Marchica lagoon and the extension of the road and rail network (the Mediterranean ring road, the Tangier-Tétouan motorway, and the Al-Hoceima-Taza expressway project). These projects meet the needs of the region in terms of creating basic infrastructures and boosting economic activities, thereby reducing, once again, the marginality from which it suffers to its economic dimension alone.

### *The merely apparent exception of the IER*

The second, eminently political aspect of the new policy pursued by Mohamed VI is the process of reconciliation undertaken by the Instance Équité et Réconciliation (IER or Equity and Reconciliation Commission). Established in 2004 to move beyond the ‘years of lead’, the IER hopes to repair systematic violations of human rights perpetrated during the period between Independence (1956) and the end of the reign of king Hassan II (1999). As an instrument of public policy, its mission is to establish the truth about these violations, to explain their context and preserve their memory.<sup>53</sup> It does not follow the rather widespread model of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions created over the last few decades,<sup>54</sup> but is distinguished by its extra-judicial nature. Though it contrasts with, and even breaks away from, previous initiatives, the IER perpetuates the same reductive reading, since it reduces the process of marginalization and repression to an intentional act and to the violation of collective economic rights.

The IER’s programme of community repair has a twofold dimension, both material and symbolic.<sup>55</sup> The first takes the form of programmes of socio-economic development likely to generate income, to strengthen the ability of community members to act, and to preserve the memory of what has happened. This is the case of the Support Programme for measures in favour of the regions affected by human rights violations in 2007, 50% of which is financed by the EU, the Agence de l’Oriental and other partners,<sup>56</sup> with the support of the foundation of the Caisse de dépôt et gestion (CDG: roughly speaking, a deposit and management bank), which resulted in calls for tender from regional associations and communities that had

---

<sup>53</sup> Article 9 of the IER’s statutes, [http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id\\_article=221](http://www.ier.ma/article.php3?id_article=221).

<sup>54</sup> S. Lefranc (ed.), *Après le conflit, la réconciliation* (Paris: Michel Houdiard, 2006).

<sup>55</sup> The programme of community reparation is set out online at: <http://ccdh.org.ma/spip.php?article324>.

<sup>56</sup> A list of partners of the programme for community reparation can be found online at: <http://ccdh.org.ma/spip.php?article1764>.

suffered serious violations of human rights – the first of which, launched in 2008, with a sum of 14 million dirhams, financed 32 projects while the second, in 2009, amounted to 20.5 million dirhams.

As for the symbolic dimension of the IER, it resided first in the choice of the Rif as one of the regions having suffered collectively from serious violations of human rights, which resulted in its being able to benefit from the programme of community reparation even though it did not fulfil all the criteria, in particular the most decisive of these, namely the existence of a secret detention centre; it was recognized that in the Rif ‘there was no detention centre but there was a perception, an attitude on the part of the state which has manifested itself throughout modern history as hostility and aggression towards this population’.<sup>57</sup> In addition, the Conseil consultatif des droits de l’homme (CCDH or Advisory Council for Human Rights) responsible for the implementation of IER recommendations launched the programme ‘Archives, histoire et mémoire’ (IER2 or ‘Archives, history and memory’) with EU funding amounting to 8 million euros over a period of four years (2009-2013). The programme is based on three main areas: history (the creation of a master’s degree in contemporary history at the Faculty of Arts and Humanities, Rabat), archives (the creation of the institution ‘Archives du Maroc’) and the preservation of memory. On this latter aspect, the programme has insisted on the rehabilitation of regions and communities affected by human rights violations, and the positive preservation of their memory. Rehabilitation concerns the places of memory and the writing of their history through the creation of dedicated spaces and memorials, the conversion of secret detention centres and the production of films and documentaries.<sup>58</sup>

In the Rif, five projects were selected (one in Al-Hoceima, four in Nador) in the first round of invitations to tender and ten for the second (eight in Al-Hoceima, two in Nador). Most were designed in the form of income-generating activities, with the exception of three relating to the preservation of memory. The treatment of marginality proposed by IER was thus reduced to income-generating activities and the heritage industry.

It would be wrong to see the IER’s tendency to restrict the meaning of marginality as a new intentional strategy on the part of the central government. In fact, this treatment seems to be a response to local demands and logic of memory, as demonstrated by community activism. On 22 February 2004, in Al-Hoceima, a first meeting on ‘The Rif: truth and possible reconciliation’ was organized at the behest of the newspaper *La gauche unifiée*, together with members of the Al-Hoceima section of the Forum vérité et justice (FVJ or Truth and Justice Forum), ex-political detainees, local association members and activists of certain political parties (USFP, PPS, PI). As a result of this meeting, the ‘Al-Hoceima Declaration’ was adopted, which gave rise to a second meeting in Al-Hoceima, on 29 and 30 January 2005, on reconciliation and human rights violations in the region in order to ‘reveal the serious violations of human rights in the Rif and to identify those responsible’. After this second meeting, a memorandum was drafted, and the ‘Rif Declaration’ made, in which it is specified

---

<sup>57</sup> Interview with Kamal Lahbib, member of the Comité du suivi national de la réparation communautaire (Committee for national monitoring of community reparation), Casablanca, March 2012.

<sup>58</sup> This was the framework that made it possible to finance Tarik El Idrissi’s film *Rif 58-59. Briser le silence*. Screened in December 2014.



that ‘the violations of collective economic rights in the form of marginalization and systematic exclusion over decades of development policies and the deliberate encouragement of drugs trafficking, smuggling and emigration in the region are a historical wrong done by the state to the Rif that programmes of collective reparation must take into account’;<sup>59</sup> the other dimension of marginality, according to the Declaration, being the lack of basic infrastructure (roads, education, employment, etc.). Again, in the view of the signatories of the Declaration, the government had adopted a deliberate policy of not developing the region.

The narrowing of the meaning of marginality in the demands for memory to be preserved is also to be seen in the design of the programmes of community reparation.<sup>60</sup> The community dimension of reparation has been a long-standing demand of ‘civil society’. At the very start of IER’s mandate, one community coalition filed a document on this subject with the authorities. With the participation of IER, the community platforms of Al-Hoceima, Agdez and Figuig organized seminars and workshops on this topic, overseen by the National Forum on Reparation which, in September 2005, brought together more than two hundred communities.<sup>61</sup> This work favoured an approach to community reparation taking into account the way in which marginalization is perceived by people. This presumption and this perception explain why the IER, in its final report, considered that certain regions and communities, including the Rif, had suffered collectively from serious violations of human rights, and that reparation should include this community dimension through programmes of socio-economic and cultural development.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, the decision to create a museum of the Rif points to a narrowing of the meaning of marginality resulting from the encounter between several logics and the demands of local agents from the IER. The museum had been requested by local civil society even before the advent of the IER, although its main object is the celebration of the heritage and memory of Mohamed ben Abdelkrim. With the IER, this idea evolved into one of the methods of community reparation and reconciliation with the region through the rehabilitation of local memory.

### **The stakes of the government of marginality through the heritage industry: making conflicts visible**

This reduction in meaning is not without consequence on the understanding of the political dynamics in play in the region. The museum is a good way into this subject, in particular because it makes it possible to read the complexity of marginality and the resulting disagreements between actors. The process of creating the museum, the keystone of the government of marginality by means of the heritage industry, makes visible a certain number of conflicts between the various actors: classic conflicts bearing on the relationship between local society and central government, but also latent conflicts over the sense of belonging, group definition and modes of government.

---

<sup>59</sup> Rif Declaration.

<sup>60</sup> The IER’s final report states that ‘in addition to compensation and reparations due to victims of serious human rights violations, reparation must include a community dimension’.

<sup>61</sup> [http://www.ier.ma/IMg/pdf/atelier\\_developpement.pdf](http://www.ier.ma/IMg/pdf/atelier_developpement.pdf).

<sup>62</sup> IER, 2006, summary of the final report, [www.ier.ma/article.php?id\\_article=1496](http://www.ier.ma/article.php?id_article=1496).

## *Conflicts over the relationship between local society and central government*

The conflict over the design of the future Al-Hoceima museum, which resulted in disagreements between the vision of the CNDH and that of some of the local associations, was rather to be expected. It was reminiscent of the ‘classical’ conflict between the centre and the local. Its first forms and manifestations were related to the nature and purpose of the future museum, and led to confrontation between the advocates of a regional museum and those who wanted a museum of memory.

In July 2011, the CNDH organized an international conference in Al-Hoceima on ‘The heritage of the Rif: what museography is best?’ in which the outlines of the future museum were presented: it would not be a ‘museum of memory’, but rather a regional museum tracing the history of the Rif from prehistory to the present day and presenting the heritage of the region in its multifaceted guises. Although the initial context of the planned museum was part of the management of the memory of human rights violations of human rights, its terms of reference included other historical periods as well as the cultural heritage of the region. ‘We do not want a museum of torture’, as certain officials of the IER 2 programme endlessly repeated at the CNDH, but rather a museum that tackled the history of the Rif in ‘its entirety and over the long term’,<sup>63</sup> focusing on its tangible and intangible heritage. Local associations strongly criticized this conception and denied that the present time was ‘drowned’ in long-term history, culture and heritage. They demanded a museum of memory of Riffian resistance, of Abdelkrim in particular, of the events of 1958-1959 and the repression that dominated the years of lead, and they saw the CNDH’s position as a deliberate will to minimize the contribution of Riffian resistance and to erase local history. The CNDH, for its part, decided that associations were ‘opposing each other just for the sake of it’, that they were minority, even marginal bodies, and that they ‘did not represent’ local society.<sup>64</sup>

These divergences did not only reflect different approaches to memory and history, they also revealed different conceptions of relations with the state and central government. The view of the CNDH, which set itself up as the representative of the central government, was based on a paternalistic and depoliticized vision that the region’s economic and cultural dynamism underlined: the mission of the Al-Hoceima museum should not be limited to reconciliation or reparation, but must consolidate the democratic process and contribute to the region’s economic development.<sup>65</sup> The associations, which adopted the position of representatives of the ‘local’, expressed a feeling of otherness in relation to the state and central government. Their conception of the museum reflected a certain localism (‘our heritage’, ‘our history’, ‘it belongs to us’) and a no less certain ‘illusion of identity’,<sup>66</sup> based on ‘being Riffian’ and belonging to the group, in a simplistic vision contrasting *bled siba* (space not subject to the authority of the state) with *bled makhzen* (space subject to the authority of the state).

---

<sup>63</sup> El Yazami and Siraj, ‘Présentation’, in *Rif: les traces de l’histoire*, p. 17.

<sup>64</sup> I am here reporting on expressions and judgements that I heard in interviews I conducted between 2010 and 2013.

<sup>65</sup> El Yazami and Siraj, ‘Présentation’, in *Rif: les traces de l’histoire*.

<sup>66</sup> J.-F. Bayart, *The Illusion of Cultural Identity*, translated by Steven Rendall, Janet Roitman, Cynthia Schoch, and Jonathan Derrick (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

Another conflict drawing on these different conceptions of the relation to central government is the conflict over the heritage of Mohamed bin Abdelkrim el-Khattabi, which is linked to the heritage industry's appropriation of the 'Abdelkrim House' and the repatriation of his body from Cairo to Ajdir. This internal conflict among Riffians has members of the el-Khattabi family at loggerheads with some local associations. The so-called Abdelkrim House, also known under the name of 'lfoussina' (a local adaptation of the Spanish word *oficina*), is the former home of the el-Khattabi family. It was Abdelkrim's headquarters during the war, before being destroyed by Spanish air force bombs. Taken over and rebuilt by the colonial administration after the war, it is currently in ruins. The first heritage plans for this place date back to the early 1990s, when Omar el-Khattabi, Abdelkrim's cousin, decided, with a group of friends, including Lfqih Basri<sup>67</sup> and Mehdi el-Manjara,<sup>68</sup> to create the Mohamed Abdelkrim el-Khattabi Foundation for research and studies in order to 'perpetuate the memory of Abdelkrim' through the creation of a museum in the Abdelkrim House; the sons of Mohammed bin Abdelkrim, in particular Saïd, were opposed to this plan, in particular because the Foundation had not obtained the authorization of the public authorities. At the urging of Mansouri bin Ali (a Riffian), who was then a member of the royal cabinet, Saïd el-Khattabi responded by creating the Association Mohamed Abdelkrim, which gained the authorization of the authorities but little support from local elites. The association and the foundation shared the same goal; the difference between them laid in the nature of the relationship to government underlying their respective projects, as revealed by the contrasting views of Omar and the Khattabi sons concerning the repatriation of Mohamed ben Abdelkrim's body from Cairo. Omar opposed it firmly, arguing that it could not be achieved 'without a prior reconciliation of the state with the Rif', while the Khattabi sons accepted this action so as to 'move on' and find 'reconciliation' with the government. Until 2008, the date of his death, Omar opposed the plan, and the question of repatriation remained a bone of contention within the family of the independence movement leader, and between this family and local actors.

On several occasions, Aisha el-Khattabi, who took up the struggle on the death of her brother Saïd, expressed her wish that the Moroccan state would repatriate their father's body,<sup>69</sup> and subsequently found herself accused by some people of being 'in the service of the makhzen' and 'in its pay'.<sup>70</sup> Beyond being a family quarrel, this split reflects different interpretations: the universality and Moroccan identity of Abdelkrim in his struggle against colonization<sup>71</sup> as opposed to his Riffian identity; and a state affair as opposed to a local political question. From the outset, conflicts over the heritage of Mohamed ben Abdelkrim did not only set family members against each other; local community members joined in, and

---

<sup>67</sup> From his name Mohamed Basri, a resistance fighter under the French protectorate and a founding member of the Union nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces or UNFP) in 1959, after breaking away from the Istiqlal party. Arrested twice for his participation in 'conspiracies against the monarchy', he chose voluntary exile from 1966. In March 1973, he was behind the rural insurrection in the Middle Atlas, in the Khenifra region, known as the Moulay Bouazza affair. He returned to Morocco in 1995, where he died after a heart attack in 2003 in Chefchaouen. He was a friend of Omar el-Khattabi.

<sup>68</sup> A professor and writer in human and social sciences.

<sup>69</sup> <http://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/30938/maroc-rapatriement-depouille-d-Abdelkrim-khattabi.html>.

<sup>70</sup> See the communiqué of the Mouvement pour l'Autonomie du Rif, issued in September 2009, at <https://thawmat.wordpress.com>.

<sup>71</sup> <http://maghrebenews.com/news.php?extend.610.1#sthash.z7sBJuzg.dpuf>.

supported one or other of the parties. Around Omar, who represented the ‘radical’ wing of the family,<sup>72</sup> there gravitated left-wing activists, Riffians who had studied in Rabat, ex-political prisoners, academics and schoolteachers, politically committed individuals and community members militating for the affirmation of a local Riffian identity. The entourage of the sons of Mohammed bin Abdelkrim, meanwhile, included academics known for their conciliatory attitude to the government, as well as notables seeking to assert themselves as a local relay of the central government, such as Ilyas El Omari, a founding member and now president of the PAM, the Parti Authenticité et Modernité (Authenticity and Modernity Party). Thus, this conflict was not just a conflict over the appropriation of the heritage and the memory of a leader, setting two clans of the same family against one another, each surrounded by militants and intellectuals and, in the case of one of the parties at least, by relays of central government. It involves contrasting positions on the relationship with the state and central government.

### *Conflicts over the definition of the group*

Debates about the type of museum to support shed considerable light on what it means to be Riffian or, more precisely, the tensions around the definition of the Riffian. An analysis of these debates will bring us to the very heart of the dynamics of identity that are in play.

The first episode, that of the Mezian Museum, was based on the alternative *resistance versus collaboration*: its protagonists were Leila Mezian, daughter of the marshal and wife of the banker Othman Benjelloun, CEO of the BMCE group, and various local associations. Leila was relatively well known in community circles, including Amazigh circles, in Nador. The BMCE Foundation, of which she was president, has been active in the Rif since the end of the 1990s through its network of rural schools, as part of the Mederast.com programme. In 2001, the foundation was behind the design of the first school textbooks for the teaching of the Amazigh language and, at that time, Leila Mezian’s involvement did not give rise to any criticism. The conflict between her and Riffian community circles emerged at the inauguration of the private museum dedicated to the memory of her father, Marshal Mezian. In May 2006, in Beni Ansar, 12 kilometres from Nador, Leila Mezian gathered a panel of political and military figures, both Moroccan and Spanish, to inaugurate the museum dedicated to her father. The ceremony, under the high patronage of King Mohamed VI as part of the framework of the fiftieth anniversary of the FAR (the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces), was presided over by Prince Moulay Rachid in the presence of members of the Government, high-ranking officials, leaders of political parties, the ambassador of Spain and members of the Spanish armed forces. The museum, through a collection of written archives and photographs, traces the Marshall’s career and the milestones in the history of the Royal

---

<sup>72</sup> Omar, the son of Abdessalam el-Khattabi, Minister of Finance in the government of the ‘Republic of the Rif’, was born in 1926 aboard the ship taking the family into exile in Reunion. After studying medicine in Switzerland, he returned to practise as a surgeon in Morocco, first at the Hôpital Avicenne in Rabat, then in his own private clinic in Kenitra. Omar was close to the radical wing of the Union nationale des forces populaires (UNPF or National Union of Popular Forces), in particular to Lfqih Basri, and was a fervent opponent of Hassan II. Arrested in the wake of the coup d’état of 16 August 1972, he was accused of being in contact with its instigators before being acquitted by the court in 1974. This time in gaol left Omar not just with various physical after-effects, but also resentment and mistrust of the Hassan II regime.

Armed Forces. It also devotes part of its funds to local cultural heritage. In front of Nador Prefecture, a sit-in was organized at the initiative of the Rif association for human rights to protest against the authorization that had been granted to open the museum. Militants and local intellectuals called for a boycott. The Spanish Left also waxed indignant.

In fact, the man known as Marshal Mezian was Mohamed ben Belkacem Azzahraoui Mezian (1897-1975), son of the caïd and chief of the Mazuza tribe who had supported the Spaniards against the resistance of the Chérif Ameziane (1909-1912). Mezian was the first Muslim student to have been admitted to the prestigious military academy of Toledo, after King Alfonso XIII had modified the statutes of the academy – which, at that time, admitted only Christians. Moved to *el ejercito de Africa*, the Army of Africa, he took part in the Rif War (1921-1927) and was seriously wounded in the Battle of Anoual (July 1921) where he was fighting against Mohamed ben Abdelkrim – although, according to certain versions, the latter had been his teacher at the native school of Melilla. In 1924, during a battle, Mezian saved Franco's life and was thus one of the first senior officers to support the coup d'état of July 1936. He is known for his role in the battles of Toledo and Ebro and the siege of Madrid, but also for his ferocity, which in turn led him to be accused of war crimes.<sup>73</sup> At the end of the war, Franco awarded him the highest rank in the army, that of captain-general. He later appointed him Commander General of Ceuta, Captain-General of Galicia, then Captain-General of the Canaries, a position he still held when King Mohamed V called on him to take part in the organization and training of the FAR in 1956. He participated in the repression of the Rif uprising in 1958-1959 and in 1966 he was appointed Ambassador of Morocco to Madrid. In 1970, he received from Hassan II the rank of marshal and thus became the highest-ranking officer in the history of the Moroccan army.

The Marshall's career explains why local public opinion was hostile to the museum; it considered Mezian as a 'collaborator', a 'traitor' or even a 'murderer' or a 'war criminal', always on the 'wrong side', whether with the Spaniards or with the makhzen. His detractors saw the museum dedicated to him as an insult to the memory of the local resistance movement. For Mohamed Chami, Scientific Advisor responsible for planning the museum, conversely, the Marshal was part of local history, and the museum was a continuation of the work of the Mezian family in favour of the promotion of local culture and the opening up of the region. Inaugurated in 2006, the museum closed its doors three years later. In the wake of the communal elections in May 2009, Yahya Yahya, the new mayor of the municipality of Beni Ansar, decided to put on hold the agreement between the municipality and the museum, an agreement under which seven municipal officials had been placed at the disposal of the museum. The decision to withdraw the municipal officials was supported by all members of the municipal council, and presented in these terms by the mayor:

I have cancelled the agreement, with the unanimous support of all parties, from the Islamists to the Left, so as not to continue to wound the sensitivities of the population of northern Morocco

---

<sup>73</sup> See the eye-witness account by American journalist J. Whitaker, *We Cannot Escape History* (New York: McMillan, 1943) and F. S. Ruano, *Islam y Guerra civil española. Moros con Franco y con la Republica* (Madrid: La esfera de Los libros, 2004).

[...]. Mezian fought with the Spanish colonizer against our hero Abdelkrim [and] the existence of this museum in our country is an insult to all patriots.<sup>74</sup>

Yahya Yahya's decision to align with the community movement was accompanied by media calls to commemorate the memory of another Riffian, an icon of the local resistance movement. This was Chérif Mohamed Amezian, descendant of a family of 'chorfa' (descendants of the Prophet) from the tribe of Beni Bu Ifrur, who took the lead in the resistance (1909-1912) against the exploitation of local mines by Spaniards and led the Riffian fighters to victory at the Battle of Barranco del Lobo (1909).

Conflicts over the Mezian Museum show that the sense of belonging to a community is also, and perhaps mainly, defined by a certain interpretation of historical facts, and that these interpretations differ, giving rise to conflicts. Being Riffian here means belonging to a 'camp': in this case that of Mohamed ben Abdelkrim in 1921 and that of Mohamed Ameziane, the leader of the rebellion of 1958-1959, against both of whom Marshal Mezian fought. But this 'camp' is above all a memorial construction: those who are part of it, who demonstrated against the opening of the museum and contributed to its closure did not experience these events, were not necessarily the descendants of the members of this 'camp' and, above all, took their stance on a simplification of history, grasped in terms of friend versus enemy and without taking into account its complexities and reversals. Thus it is not enough to be a native of a certain country or to live in it, to speak a certain language, or to recognize the specificity of a certain terroir: you also and indeed mainly need to share the same interpretation of history. It is therefore understandable that conflicts can arise, especially since the history of this region is a violent history that, contrary to what is often said, not only sets the Rif against the centre, but also, and perhaps especially, sets Riffians against each other. The definition of the 'Riffian' thus comes up against competing memories. The episode of Marshal Mezian's museum suggests the current hegemony of the memory of resistance, which remains the only legitimate local memory, and is symbolized by the reconstructed figures of Chérif Mohamed Ameziane as the first resistant fighter against the Spaniards, Mohamed ben Abdelkrim as leader of the resistance movement and creator of unity between the tribes, and Mohamed Ameziane as resisting the repression imposed by the newly created state. Political sensitivities, which take pride in the fact that a Riffian was able to become the first and only marshal in Morocco, or was the first to pursue his military studies in Spain for military studies, are now a side issue and cannot be imposed locally, even though they could equally well be used to define the Riffian as valiant, warlike, strong-willed and open to the world.

Another episode adds complexity to the question of the sense of belonging, while confirming the hegemony of the memory of the resistance movement. This is the location of the Al-Hoceima Museum, which saw a confrontation between various resistance fighters, and raised the question of Riffian identity from the different positions one could occupy in the resistance, and indeed the very definition of 'resistance'.

In addition to the conflict between central and local authorities on the one hand (CNDH, and the municipal authorities of Al-Hoceima), who favoured the choice of the building of the

---

<sup>74</sup> 'Retirada la ayuda pública en Marruecos al museo dedicado al general rifeño that salvó la vida a Franco', [http://elpais.com/elpais/2009/11/30/actualidad/1259572617\\_850215.html](http://elpais.com/elpais/2009/11/30/actualidad/1259572617_850215.html).

ex-Bachaouia of Al-Hoceima to house the future museum, and local associations on the other, which defended the choice of the Abdelkrim House, the location of the museum led to conflicts between Riffians. For example, Al-Hoceima was contrasted with Nador. For the advocates of Nador, this city was the focus of resistance in the figure of Chérif Mohamed Amezian (1909-1912), presented as the pioneer of Riffian resistance, whose action was described as the 'First Rif war', which put him on an equal footing with the war waged by Mohamed ben Abdelkrim from 1921 to 1927. The memory entrepreneurs who highlight the figure of Chérif Mohamed Amezian recall that he was the first to resist at a time when even Abdelkrim and his son were collaborating with the Spaniards. It is this priority which in their view legitimates the place of Chérif Mohamed Amezian in local memory and history, as much as if not more than Mohamed ben Abdelkrim. The supporters of Al-Hoceima, meanwhile, refer only to the latter. If they recognize the resistance of Chérif Mohamed Amezian, they feel that it remained localized and did not reach the universality, the revolutionary and revitalizing character of the political and social project fostered by Abdelkrim – who, as a result, is not only presented as a war leader but as a politician, a leader embodying Riffian unity and a plan for society.<sup>75</sup>

This competition between different local memories of resistance was also a conflict between tribes, a conflict that was obviously rarely explicit and expressed only locally. The political desire to honour the Rif undermined and fragmented the criteria for belonging to the group, thus bringing to light the tribal issue. We should remember that, historically, the resistance put up by tribes has always been localized, with each tribe contenting itself with defending its territory. When faced with a danger or an enemy from outside, tribes have managed to form coalitions, but these have always been circumstantial, fragile and reversible. Such was the case of the attempt of Chérif Mohamed Amezian to organize a common defence of the tribes. The strength of his movement crumbled at the very moment of his death, or even before, as soon as the Sultan Moulay Abdelhafid refused to send him reinforcements and came to an agreement with the Spanish, on 16 November 1910.<sup>76</sup> Furthermore, several local tribes and notables, including Abdelkrim el-Khattabi and his son, did not join the resistance of Chérif Mohamed Amezian.<sup>77</sup> Similarly, when Abdelkrim joined the resistance movement in 1920, and supervised trench construction operations in the territory of the Tefersit tribe, he met with opposition from this tribe allegedly because he was a stranger, and should restrict himself to building trenches in the territory of his own tribe.<sup>78</sup> Forging the unity of the Riffian tribes after victory in the Battle of Anoual (July 1921) was not an easy task, nor was it a complete success. Today, these tribal conflicts are reproduced in terms of tribal hegemony, and more specifically that of the hegemony of the Ait Ouriaghel, referring in particular to the role as relays and approved intermediaries of the government currently played by certain local figures such as Ilyas El Omari. These conflicts affect any constructed visions of an absolute,

---

<sup>75</sup> Many of those I spoke to said the same thing, such as Ali Idrissi, who stated: 'Abdelkrim was the man of his time, he was a democrat, he believed in institutions and not people. He was a liberal, he said that the triumph of freedom in every corner of the world was our triumph and, and he defended social justice'. Interview, Rabat, 2009.

<sup>76</sup> Ayache, *Les Origines de la guerre du Rif*, p. 144.

<sup>77</sup> M. R. de Madariaga, *Abd-el-Krim el Jatabi: la lucha por la independencia*, (Madrid: Alianza editorial, 2009), pp. 77-79.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 389.

firm, united resistance on the part of the Riffians against the Spanish. They highlight the difficulty, if not the impossibility of defining what it means to be Riffian, and remind us of how the ‘illusion of identity’ is driven by political dynamics and relations of power that inevitably involve conflict.

### *Competition for heritage resources: conflicts over modes of government*

The third set of conflicts this process reveals relates to the beneficiaries of the material and symbolic resources of community reparation, including the museum. These conflicts reveal the different conceptions of ways of governing the group, in other words, different conceptions of the exercise of power and of how to seize its resources and symbols.

With a view to ensuring the implementation of community reparation and its monitoring, two local coordinating bodies have been set up, one in Al-Hoceima and the other in Nador, involving the CCDH, local authorities, decentralized state services, local groups and local associations. The choice of these associations has raised many criticisms. The local branches of the AMDH (Association marocaine des droits de l’homme, or Moroccan association of human rights) and the FVJ, for example, challenged the local coordination of Al-Hoceima on the grounds that ‘the CCDH did not consult the associations and human rights bodies concerned, but merely a few development associations and women’s associations without any credibility’.<sup>79</sup> The authorities explained that the choice of the associations had been guided by their previous involvement in the development and design of the community reparation programme. Such was the case with the Al Amal network for relief and sustainable development, which was part of the platform of the Al-Hoceima associations that participated in seminars and workshops on reparation in 2005 and was involved in the collection and distribution of earthquake relief in 2004. However, apart from this association and another one, Bades, whose activities in the field (earthquake, IGA projects in rural areas) is indisputable, the other associations co-opted (the Touya Association for Women’s Work, the Al Manal Women’s Association, the Mediterranean Youth Association for the Development of the Rif and the Massirat Annour association) actually have little presence or influence on the local scene. In Nador, the local branch of the FVJ, unlike that of Al-Hoceima, agreed to participate in the community reparation programme. But this did not prevent associations from disavowing the choice of members from the coordinating body. For example, the Ussen cultural association described the CCDH method as ‘discriminatory treatment which excludes human rights associations, as well as Amazigh associations, including Ussen, from the consultations for the establishment of a local coordination body in Nador’.<sup>80</sup> This association has, however, presented itself to tenders issued as part of the first instalment of the programme of community reparation and pioneered a project on the writing of the history of the Rif events of 1958-1959, in the name of compliance of tenders with international standards.<sup>81</sup>

However, very few associations responded to the first series of calls for tenders. In Al-Hoceima, only one association presented a project (poultry farming) and four associations

---

<sup>79</sup> Communiqué of 11 January 2008.

<sup>80</sup> Communiqué of 15 January 2008.

<sup>81</sup> Interview with M. El Hamouchi, chair of Ussen.



from Nador put forward proposals on the preservation of memory, building up management and youth skills, and the modernization of local beekeeping. For the second round of calls for tender, eight projects were selected in Al-Hoceima, one of which dealt with the preservation of cultural and historical memory by the theatre, another with the collection of data and information on the period of violations of human rights and other IGA micro-projects, such as the creation of women's cooperatives, literacy, rose-planting – as against just two projects in Nador – on the structuring of civil society and the shaping of environmental awareness among people with disabilities. The critiques of the method of consultation and the criteria of choice for members of the coordination are not in themselves enough to explain the lack of interest and responses shown by associations to calls for tenders. The complexity of the procedures has been the main obstacle to their participation, as European standards require skills and resources which the associations do not possess and fostering a bureaucratization of development.<sup>82</sup> Also, projects on the 'preservation of memory' have been few in number, while the so-called development projects did not meet expectations. The CCDH had difficulties in defining what community reparation actually was, and people understood this development in terms of traditional economic development programmes.<sup>83</sup>

Be that as it may – and this is what interests us – the reparation programme, which brought in significant financial and symbolic resources, allowed political and ideological divisions between human rights associations and local development associations to be expressed, by whetting appetites and exacerbating conflicts. The preliminary work for the establishment of the Al-Hoceima museum (conference, partnership agreement, museological study) highlighted other types of conflicts about the quality and the choice of those responsible for the day-to-day management of the future museum.

A first initiative set the CNDH against the Ministry of Culture which, because of its absence from the partnership convention associating the CNDH, the Al-Hoceima municipal authorities, the Taza-Al-Hoceima-Taounate Museum and the CCME (Conseil consultatif des Marocains à l'étranger, or Advisory Council of Moroccans abroad), felt dispossessed. This was a classic conflict of jurisdiction between traditional ministries and autonomous entities backed by royal power; hence the tensions between the government and the Palace, that is, tensions between a particular mode of government through the 'royal road' which simultaneously involves and permits urgency, speed and abundance of resources but is temporary, and an administrative mode of government that is characterized by slowness and a real lack of resources but is sustainable and has the requisite bureaucratic skills.<sup>84</sup>

The second conflict, which concerns the entity responsible for the management of the future museum, reflects the difficulty of decentralizing or leaving local autonomy in place. This is a conflict by default: the CNDH does not want to get involved in management, not even through its regional commission, and the mayor of Al-Hoceima has neither the money nor the human resources to do so. The status and operation of the future museum depend on the new regional demarcations of responsibility and the new functions given to territorial

---

<sup>82</sup> B. Hibou, *The Bureaucratization of the World in the Neoliberal Era*, trans. Andrew Brown (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).

<sup>83</sup> Interview with Kamal Lahbib, March 2012.

<sup>84</sup> On these two modes of government, see B. Hibou and M. Tozy, 'Une lecture wébérienne de la trajectoire de l'État au Maroc', *Sociétés politiques comparées*, 37, December 2015 (accessible on [http://www.fasopo.org/sites/default/files/varia1\\_n37.pdf](http://www.fasopo.org/sites/default/files/varia1_n37.pdf))

collective spaces (municipality, region). This ambiguity raises another difficulty, related to the research and the mobilization of funds necessary for the construction of the museum.

The third conflict refers to the mode of government of regions, and more specifically government through the 'authorized intermediaries' of power. In this case, the role played by Ilyas El Omari, behind the scenes or via his brother the entrepreneur, in the process of making certain decisions, by mobilizing his networks of interpersonal knowledge or acting indirectly, has led to tensions between the supporters of this intercession to facilitate the resolution of a conflict between the architect of the project and the municipal authorities of Al-Hoceima, and those who saw it as wielding an occult and problematic influence.

All these conflicts illustrate the ambiguity of the government of marginality in the Rif through its heritage industry. The gap between the complexity of the region's historical trajectory and its representation in the form of economic and political marginality lies behind speeches given, but also behind the public policies which, by obscuring the diversity of viewpoints and logics at work, have paradoxically exacerbated the conflicts between the players, behind an apparent consensus. In return, these conflicts have allowed for the development of relationships and actions which show up the contours of the government of the social by bringing to light the diversity of points of tension and different understandings of what it means to be Riffian, to be a citizen, and to be national.